DeceptiveDevelopment targets freelance builders

Cybercriminals have been recognized to method their targets below the guise of firm recruiters, engaging them with pretend employment provides. In any case, what higher time to strike than when the potential sufferer is distracted by the potential for getting a job? Since early 2024, ESET researchers have noticed a collection of malicious North Korea-aligned actions, the place the operators, posing as headhunters, attempt to serve their targets with software program initiatives that conceal infostealing malware. We name this exercise cluster DeceptiveDevelopment.

As a part of a pretend job interview course of, the DeceptiveDevelopment operators ask their targets to do a coding check, similar to including a function to an current venture, with the recordsdata vital for the duty normally hosted on non-public repositories on GitHub or different related platforms. Sadly for the keen work candidate, these recordsdata are trojanized: as soon as they obtain and execute the venture, the sufferer’s laptop will get compromised with the operation’s first-stage malware, BeaverTail.

DeceptiveDevelopment was first publicly described by Phylum and Unit 42 in 2023, and has already been partially documented below the names Contagious Interview and DEV#POPPER. We now have carried out additional evaluation of this exercise cluster and its operator’s preliminary entry strategies, community infrastructure, and toolset, together with new variations of the 2 malware households utilized by DeceptiveDevelopment – InvisibleFerret, and the aforementioned BeaverTail.

Key factors of this blogpost:

• DeceptiveDevelopment targets freelance software program builders by spearphishing on job-hunting and freelancing websites, aiming to steal cryptocurrency wallets and login data from browsers and password managers.
• Lively since no less than November 2023, this operation primarily makes use of two malware households – BeaverTail (infostealer, downloader) and InvisibleFerret (infostealer, RAT).
• DeceptiveDevelopment’s techniques, strategies, and procedures (TTPs) are much like a number of different recognized North Korea-aligned operations.

We first noticed this DeceptiveDevelopment marketing campaign in early 2024, once we found trojanized initiatives hosted on GitHub with malicious code hidden on the finish of lengthy feedback, successfully shifting the code off-screen. These initiatives delivered the BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware. Along with analyzing the 2 malware households, we additionally began investigating the C&C infrastructure behind the marketing campaign. Since then, we’ve got been monitoring this cluster and its advances in technique and tooling utilized in these ongoing assaults. This blogpost describes the TTPs of this marketing campaign, in addition to the malware it makes use of.

DeceptiveDevelopment profile

DeceptiveDevelopment is a North Korea-aligned exercise cluster that we presently don’t attribute to any recognized menace actor. Operators behind DeceptiveDevelopment goal software program builders on Home windows, Linux, and macOS. They primarily steal cryptocurrency for monetary achieve, with a doable secondary goal of cyberespionage.

To method their targets, these operators use pretend recruiter profiles on social media, not not like the Lazarus group in Operation DreamJob (as described in this WeLiveSecurity blogpost). Nevertheless, whereas Operation DreamJob focused protection and aerospace engineers, DeceptiveDevelopment reaches out to freelance software program builders, usually these concerned in cryptocurrency initiatives. To compromise its victims’ computer systems, DeceptiveDevelopment gives its targets with trojanized codebases that deploy backdoors as a part of a pretend job interview course of.

Victimology

The first targets of this DeceptiveDevelopment marketing campaign are software program builders, primarily these concerned in cryptocurrency and decentralized finance initiatives. The attackers don’t distinguish based mostly on geographical location and goal to compromise as many victims as doable to extend the probability of efficiently extracting funds and knowledge.

We now have noticed a whole lot of various victims world wide, utilizing all three main working programs – Home windows, Linux, and macOS. They ranged from junior builders simply beginning their freelance careers to extremely skilled professionals within the discipline. We solely noticed attacker–sufferer conversations in English, however can not say with certainty that the attackers is not going to use translation instruments to speak with victims who don’t communicate that language. A map exhibiting the worldwide distribution of victims might be seen in Determine 1.

Attribution

We contemplate DeceptiveDevelopment to be a North Korea-aligned exercise cluster with excessive confidence based mostly on a number of parts:

• We noticed connections between GitHub accounts managed by the attackers and accounts containing pretend CVs utilized by North Korean IT staff. These individuals apply for jobs in overseas firms below false identities with a purpose to acquire salaries to assist fund the regime. The noticed connections have been mutual follows between GitHub profiles the place one aspect was related to DeceptiveDevelopment, and the opposite contained pretend CVs and different materials associated to North Korean IT employee exercise. Related connections have been additionally noticed by Unit42. Sadly, the GitHub pages have been taken down earlier than we have been in a position to document all of the proof.
• The TTPs (use of faux recruiters, trojanized job challenges, and software program used throughout interviews) are much like different North Korea-aligned exercise (Moonstone Sleet, and Lazarus’s DreamJob and DangerousPassword campaigns).

Along with the connections between the GitHub profiles, the malware utilized in DeceptiveDevelopment is reasonably easy. This tracks with the reporting performed by Mandiant claiming that the IT staff’ work is normally of poor high quality.

Whereas monitoring DeceptiveDevelopment exercise, we noticed quite a few circumstances exhibiting a scarcity of consideration to element on the a part of the menace actors. In a few of them, the authors didn’t take away growth notes or commented-out native IP addresses used for growth and testing. We additionally noticed samples the place they appear to have forgotten to obfuscate the C&C tackle after altering it; this may be seen in Determine 2. Moreover, the malware makes use of freely accessible obfuscation instruments with hyperlinks to them generally left in code feedback.

Technical evaluation

Preliminary entry

With the intention to pose as recruiters, the attackers copy profiles of current individuals and even assemble new personas. They then both instantly method their potential victims on job-hunting and freelancing platforms or publish pretend job listings there. At first, the menace actors used model new profiles and would merely ship hyperlinks to malicious GitHub initiatives by way of LinkedIn to their supposed targets. Later, they began utilizing profiles that seem established, with many followers and connections, to look extra reliable, and branched out to extra job-hunting and code-hosting web sites. Whereas a few of these profiles are arrange by the attackers themselves, others are doubtlessly compromised profiles of actual individuals on the platform, modified by the attackers.

Among the platforms the place these interactions happen are generic job-hunting ones, whereas others focus totally on cryptocurrency and blockchain initiatives and are thus extra in step with the attackers’ targets. The platforms embody:

• LinkedIn,
• Upwork,
• Freelancer.com,
• We Work Remotely,
• Moonlight, and
• Crypto Jobs Listing.

Essentially the most generally noticed compromise vector consists of the pretend recruiter offering the sufferer with a trojanized venture below the guise of a hiring problem or serving to the “recruiter” repair a bug for a monetary reward.

Victims obtain the venture recordsdata both instantly by way of file switch on the positioning or by a hyperlink to a repository like GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket. They’re requested to obtain the recordsdata, add options or repair bugs, and report again to the recruiter. Moreover, they’re instructed to construct and execute the venture with a purpose to check it, which is the place the preliminary compromise occurs. The repositories used are normally non-public, so the sufferer is first requested to supply their account ID or electronic mail tackle to be granted entry to them, almost certainly to hide the malicious exercise from researchers.

Regardless of that, we noticed many circumstances the place these repositories have been publicly accessible, however realized that these belong principally to victims who, after finishing their duties, uploaded them to their very own repositories. Determine 3 exhibits an instance of a trojanized venture hosted on GitHub. We now have reported all noticed malicious code to the affected companies.

The trojanized initiatives fall into considered one of 4 classes:

• hiring challenges,
• cryptocurrency initiatives,
• video games (normally with blockchain performance), and
• playing with blockchain/cryptocurrency options.

These repositories are sometimes duplicates of current open-source initiatives or demos, with little to no change apart from including the malicious code and altering the README file. Among the malicious venture names and names of attacker-controlled accounts working them (the place we may assess them) are listed in Desk 1.

Desk 1. Noticed venture names and repository/commit authors

We additionally noticed the attackers impersonating current initiatives and firms by utilizing related names or appending LLC, Ag, or Inc (abbreviations of authorized firm varieties) to the names, as seen in Desk 2.

Desk 2. Noticed venture names and repository/commit authors impersonating reliable initiatives

The attackers usually use a intelligent trick to cover their malicious code: they place it in an in any other case benign element of the venture, normally inside backend code unrelated to the duty given to the developer, the place they append it as a single line behind an extended remark. This fashion, it’s moved off-screen and stays hidden except the sufferer scrolls to it or has the phrase wrap function of their code editor enabled. Apparently, GitHub’s personal code editor doesn’t allow phrase wrap, so the malicious code is straightforward to overlook even when code within the repository, as proven in Determine 4.

One other compromise vector we noticed consisted of the pretend recruiter inviting the sufferer to a job interview utilizing a web based conferencing platform and offering a hyperlink to a web site from which the required conferencing software program might be downloaded. The web site is normally a clone of an current conferencing platform’s web site, as seen in Determine 5, and the downloaded software program accommodates the primary stage of the malware.

Toolset

DeceptiveDevelopment primarily makes use of two malware households as a part of its actions, delivered in two phases. The primary stage, BeaverTail, has each a JavaScript and a local variant (written in C++ utilizing the Qt platform), and is delivered to the sufferer, disguised as part of a venture the sufferer is requested to work on, a hiring problem, or inside trojanized distant conferencing software program similar to MiroTalk or FreeConference.

BeaverTail acts as a easy login stealer, extracting browser databases containing saved logins, and as a downloader for the second stage, InvisibleFerret. That is modular Python-based malware that features spyware and adware and backdoor elements, and can be able to downloading the reliable AnyDesk distant administration and monitoring software program for post-compromise actions. Determine 6 exhibits the total compromise chain from preliminary compromise, by knowledge exfiltration, to the deployment of AnyDesk.

Each BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret have been beforehand documented by Unit 42, Group-IB, and Goal-See. A parallel investigation was additionally printed by Zscaler, whose findings we are able to independently verify. Our evaluation accommodates particulars that haven’t been publicly reported earlier than and presents a complete overview of the malicious exercise.

BeaverTail

BeaverTail is the title for the infostealer and downloader malware utilized by DeceptiveDevelopment. There are two totally different variations – one written in JavaScript and positioned instantly into the trojanized initiatives with easy obfuscation, and native variations, constructed utilizing the Qt platform, which might be disguised as conferencing software program and have been initially described by Goal-See. Each variations have robust similarities of their functionalities.

This malware targets Home windows, Linux, and macOS programs, with the goal of accumulating saved login data and cryptocurrency pockets knowledge.

It begins by getting the C&C IP tackle and port. Whereas the IP addresses fluctuate, the ports used are normally both 1224 or 1244, making the malicious community exercise simply identifiable. Within the JavaScript model, the IP tackle and port are obfuscated utilizing base64 encoding, cut up into three elements, and swapped round to forestall automated decoding. Different strings are additionally encoded with base64, usually with one dummy character prepended to the ensuing string to thwart easy decoding makes an attempt. The native model has the IP, port, and different strings all saved in plaintext. The obfuscated JavaScript code might be seen in Determine 7, and the deobfuscated code in Determine 8.

BeaverTail then seems to be for browser extensions put in within the Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Opera, and Courageous browsers and checks whether or not any of them match extension names from a hardcoded record from Chrome Net Retailer or Microsoft Edge Add-ons, proven under. The browser listed in parentheses is the supply of the extension; be aware that each Opera and Courageous additionally use extensions from Chrome Net Retailer, as they’re Chromium-based.

• nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn – MetaMask (Chrome)
• ejbalbakoplchlghecdalmeeeajnimhm – MetaMask (Edge)
• fhbohimaelbohpjbbldcngcnapndodjp – BNB Chain Pockets (Chrome)
• hnfanknocfeofbddgcijnmhnfnkdnaad – Coinbase Pockets (Chrome)
• ibnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklmnkoeoihofec – TronLink (Chrome)
• bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjophhpkkoljpa – Phantom (Chrome)
• fnjhmkhhmkbjkkabndcnnogagogbneec – Ronin Pockets (Chrome)
• aeachknmefphepccionboohckonoeemg – Coin98 Pockets (Chrome)
• hifafgmccdpekplomjjkcfgodnhcellj – Crypto.com Pockets (Chrome)

If they’re discovered, any .ldb and .log recordsdata from the extensions’ directories are collected and exfiltrated.

Other than these recordsdata, the malware additionally targets a file containing the Solana keys saved within the person’s residence listing in .config/solana/id.json. BeaverTail then seems to be for saved login data in /Library/Keychains/‌login.keychain (for macOS) or /.native/share/keyrings/ (for Linux). In the event that they exist, the Firefox login databases key3.db, key4.db, and logins.json from /.mozilla/firefox/ are additionally exfiltrated throughout this time.

Every BeaverTail pattern accommodates a sufferer ID used for identification. These IDs are used all through the entire compromise chain as identifiers in all downloads and uploads. We suspect that these IDs are distinctive to every sufferer and are used to attach the stolen data to the sufferer’s public profile.

The collected knowledge together with the pc hostname and present timestamp is uploaded to the /uploads API endpoint on the C&C server. Then, a standalone Python atmosphere is downloaded in an archive known as p2.zip, hosted on the C&C server, to allow execution of the subsequent stage. Lastly, the subsequent stage is downloaded from the C&C server (API endpoint /shopper/<campaign_ID>) into the person’s residence listing below the title .npl and executed utilizing the downloaded Python atmosphere.

In August 2024, we noticed a brand new model of the JavaScript BeaverTail, the place the code positioned within the trojanized venture acted solely as a loader and downloaded and executed the precise payload code from a distant server. This model additionally used a distinct obfuscation approach and added 4 new cryptocurrency pockets extensions to the record of targets:

• jblndlipeogpafnldhgmapagcccfchpi – Kaia Pockets (Chrome)
• acmacodkjbdgmoleebolmdjonilkdbch – Rabby Pockets (Chrome)
• dlcobpjiigpikoobohmabehhmhfoodbb – Argent X – Starknet Pockets (Chrome)
• aholpfdialjgjfhomihkjbmgjidlcdno – Exodus Web3 Pockets (Chrome)

When investigating the ipcheck[.]cloud web site, we seen that the homepage is a mirror of the malicious mirotalk[.]internet web site, serving native BeaverTail malware disguised as distant conferencing software program, indicating a direct connection between the brand new JavaScript and the native variations of BeaverTail.

InvisibleFerret

InvisibleFerret is modular Python malware with capabilities for data theft and distant attacker management. It consists of 4 modules – principal (the .npl file), payload (pay), browser (bow), and AnyDesk (adc). The malware has no persistence mechanism in place apart from the AnyDesk shopper deployed on the finish of the compromise chain. After gaining persistence by way of AnyDesk, the attackers can execute InvisibleFerret at will.

Apparently, most of its backdoor performance requires an operator (or scripted conduct) on the different aspect sending instructions, deciding what knowledge to exfiltrate and easy methods to propagate the assault. In all variations of InvisibleFerret that we noticed, the backdoor elements are activated upon operator command. The one performance not executed by the operator is the preliminary fingerprinting, which is finished routinely.

Fundamental module

The principle module, initially named principal, is the .npl file that BeaverTail downloaded from the C&C server and saved into the house listing. It’s liable for downloading and executing particular person payload modules. All modules include an XOR-encrypted and base64-encoded payload, preceded by 4 bytes representing the XOR key, adopted by code to decrypt and execute it by way of exec, as seen in Determine 9. Every module additionally accommodates the sType variable, containing the present sufferer ID. This ID is a duplicate of the ID specified within the obtain request. When a request is made to obtain the script file, the given ID is positioned because the sType worth into the ultimate script file by the C&C server’s API.

This module accommodates a hardcoded C&C tackle encoded with base64 and cut up into two halves which were swapped to make decoding tougher. Usually that we noticed, this tackle was an identical to the one used within the previous BeaverTail pattern. The principle module downloads the payload module from /payload/<campaign_ID> to .n2/pay within the person’s residence listing and executes it. Afterwards, if operating on macOS (decided by checking whether or not a name to the platform.system operate returns Darwin), it exits. On different working programs it additionally downloads the browser module from /forehead/<campaign_ID> to .n2/bow within the person’s residence listing and executes that in a separate Python occasion.

Payload module

The pay module consists of two elements – one collects data and the opposite serves as a backdoor. The primary half accommodates a hardcoded C&C URL, normally much like the beforehand used ones, and collects the next:

• the person’s UUID,
• OS kind,
• PC title,
• username,
• system model (launch),
• native IP tackle, and
• public IP tackle and geolocation data (area title, nation, metropolis, ZIP code, ISP, latitude and longitude) parsed from http://ip-api.com/json.

This data, illustrated in Determine 10, is then uploaded to the /keys API endpoint utilizing HTTP POST.

The second half acts as a TCP backdoor, and a TCP reverse shell, accepting distant instructions from the C&C server and speaking by way of a socket connection. It normally makes use of port 1245, however we additionally noticed ports 80, 2245, 3001, and 5000. Notably, the C&C IP tackle hardcoded on this half was totally different from the earlier ones generally, most likely to separate the extra suspicious remaining community exercise from the preliminary deployment.

The second payload checks whether or not it’s executing below Home windows – whether it is, it permits a keylogger applied utilizing pyWinHook and a clipboard stealer utilizing pyperclip, proven in Determine 11. These acquire and retailer any keypresses and clipboard adjustments in a worldwide buffer and run in a devoted thread for so long as the script itself is operating.

Afterwards, it executes the backdoor performance, which consists of eight instructions, described in Desk 3.

Desk 3. Instructions applied in InvisibleFerret

Every command is called with the prefix ssh_ and assigned a numerical worth for use when speaking with the server. For every command obtained, a brand new thread is spawned to execute it and the shopper instantly begins listening for the subsequent command. Replies to instructions are despatched asynchronously because the instructions end executing. The 2-way communication is finished over sockets, in JSON format, with two fields:

• command – denoting the numerical command ID.
• args – containing any extra knowledge despatched between the server and shopper.

The script additionally accommodates lists of excluded file and listing names (similar to cache and momentary directories for software program initiatives and repositories) to be skipped when exfiltrating knowledge, and an inventory of fascinating title patterns to exfiltrate (atmosphere and configuration recordsdata; paperwork, spreadsheets, and different recordsdata containing the phrases secret, pockets, non-public, password, and many others.)

Browser module

The bow module is liable for stealing login knowledge, autofill knowledge, and cost data saved by net browsers. The focused browsers are Chrome, Courageous, Opera, Yandex, and Edge, all Chromium-based, with a number of variations listed for every of the three main working programs (Home windows, Linux, macOS) as proven in Determine 13.

It searches by the browser’s native storage folders (an instance is proven in Determine 14) and copies the databases containing login and cost data to the %Temp% folder on Home windows or the /tmp folder on different programs, into two recordsdata:

• LoginData.db containing person login data, and
• webdata.db containing saved cost data (bank cards).

As a result of the saved passwords and bank card numbers are saved in an encrypted format utilizing AES, they have to be decrypted earlier than exfiltration. The encryption keys used for this are obtained based mostly on the working system in use. On Home windows, they’re extracted from the browser’s Native State file, on Linux they’re obtained by the secretstorage bundle, and on macOS they’re obtained by the safety utility, as illustrated in Determine 15.

The collected data (see Determine 16) is then despatched to the C&C server by way of an HTTP POST request to the /keys API endpoint.

AnyDesk module

The adc module is the one persistence mechanism discovered on this compromise chain, establishing AnyDesk entry to the sufferer’s laptop utilizing a configuration file containing hardcoded login credentials.

On Home windows, it checks whether or not the C:/Program Recordsdata (x86)/AnyDesk/AnyDesk.exe exists. If not, it downloads anydesk.exe from the C&C server (http://<C&C_IP>:<C&C_port>/anydesk.exe) into the person’s residence listing.

Then it makes an attempt to arrange AnyDesk for entry by the attacker by getting into hardcoded password hash, password salt, and token salt values into the configuration recordsdata. If the configuration recordsdata don’t exist or don’t include a given attacker-specified password salt worth, the module makes an attempt to change them so as to add the hardcoded login data. If that fails, it creates a PowerShell script within the person’s residence listing named conf.ps1, containing code to change the configuration recordsdata (proven in Determine 17) and makes an attempt to launch it.

After these actions full, the AnyDesk course of is killed after which began once more to load the brand new configuration. Lastly, the adc module makes an attempt to delete itself by calling the os.take away operate on itself.

InvisibleFerret replace

We later found an up to date model of InvisibleFerret with main adjustments, used since no less than August 2024. It’s not separated into particular person modules, however reasonably exists as a single massive script file (however nonetheless retaining the backdoor instructions to selectively set up the browser and AnyDesk modules). There are additionally slight code modifications for elevated help of macOS, for instance accumulating the username together with the hostname of the pc.

One other modification we noticed is the addition of an identifier named gType, along with sType. It acts as a secondary sufferer/marketing campaign identifier along with sType when downloading modules from the C&C server (e.g., <C&C_IP>:<port>/<module>/<sType>/<gType>). We haven’t seen it used to label the exfiltrated knowledge.

This new model of InvisibleFerret has additionally applied an extra backdoor command, ssh_zcp, able to exfiltrating knowledge from browser extensions and password managers by way of Telegram and FTP.

With the brand new command, InvisibleFerret first seems to be for and, if current, collects knowledge from 88 browser extensions for the Chrome, Courageous, and Edge browsers after which locations it right into a staging folder within the system’s momentary listing. The entire record of extensions might be discovered within the Appendix and the code for accumulating the information is proven in Determine 18.

Other than the extension knowledge, the command may exfiltrate data from the Atomic and Exodus cryptocurrency wallets on all programs, along with 1Password, Electrum, WinAuth, Proxifier4, and Dashlane on Home windows. That is illustrated in Determine 19.

The information is then archived and uploaded to a Telegram chat utilizing the Telegram API with a bot token, in addition to to an FTP server. As soon as the add is finished, InvisibleFerret removes each the staging folder and the archive.

Clipboard stealer module

In December 2024 we found yet one more model of InvisibleFerret, containing an extra module named mlip, downloaded from the C&C endpoint /mclip/<campaign_ID> to .n2/mlip. This module accommodates the keylogging and clipboard-stealing performance that was separated from the remainder of the payload module.

Displaying an development in technical capabilities of the operators, the keylogging and clipboard stealing performance of this module has been restricted to 2 processes solely, chrome.exe and courageous.exe, whereas the sooner variations of InvisibleFerret logged any and all keystrokes. The collected knowledge is uploaded to a brand new API endpoint, /api/clip.

Community infrastructure

DeceptiveDevelopment’s community infrastructure consists of devoted servers hosted by business internet hosting suppliers, with the three mostly used suppliers being RouterHosting (now referred to as Cloudzy), Stark Industries Options, and Pier7ASN. The server API is written in Node.js and consists of 9 endpoints, listed in Desk 4.

Desk 4. DeceptiveDevelopment C&C API endpoints

Most C&C communication we noticed was performed over ports 1224 or 1244 (sometimes 80 or 3000) for C&C communication over HTTP, and 1245 (sometimes 80, 2245, 3001, 5000, or 5001) for backdoor C&C communication over TCP sockets. All communication from the shopper to the C&C server, besides downloading the Python atmosphere, accommodates the marketing campaign ID. For InvisibleFerret downloads, the ID is added to the top of the URL within the GET request. For knowledge exfiltration, the ID is shipped as a part of the POST request within the kind discipline. That is helpful for figuring out community visitors and figuring out what particular pattern and marketing campaign it belongs to.

The marketing campaign IDs (sType and gType values) we noticed are alphanumeric and don’t appear to bear any direct relation to the marketing campaign. Earlier than the introduction of gType, a few of the sType values have been base64 strings containing variants of the phrase staff and numbers, similar to 5Team9 and 7tEaM;. After gType was launched, most noticed values for each values have been purely numeric, with out using base64.

Conclusion

The DeceptiveDevelopment cluster is an addition to an already massive assortment of money-making schemes employed by North Korea-aligned actors and conforms to an ongoing pattern of shifting focus from conventional cash to cryptocurrencies. Throughout our analysis, we noticed it go from primitive instruments and strategies to extra superior and succesful malware, in addition to extra polished strategies to lure in victims and deploy the malware. Any on-line job-hunting and freelancing platform might be liable to being abused for malware distribution by pretend recruiters. We proceed to look at vital exercise associated to this marketing campaign and anticipate DeceptiveDevelopment to proceed innovating and trying to find extra methods to focus on cryptocurrency customers.

For any inquiries about our analysis printed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com. 

ESET Analysis provides non-public APT intelligence reviews and knowledge feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Menace Intelligence web page.

IoCs

A complete record of indicators of compromise (IoCs) and samples might be present in our GitHub repository.

Recordsdata

Community

MITRE ATT&CK strategies

This desk was constructed utilizing model 16 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Appendix